

The role of Pakistan in the establishment of the Mujahideen state in Afghanistan

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Abstract: This article examines one of the most important events in the history of Afghanistan, the struggle for government between the Mujahideen and the role of Pakistan, an active participant in this process. Also, the period of the interim government in Afghanistan and the external and internal factors in its formation are analyzed.

Key words: Peshawar agreements, AXDP, Dostumistan, Masudistan, transitional government, Islamic Coordination Council of Afghanistan, Watan party, coalition government.

By the end of the 20th century, several changes of government in Afghanistan complicated the current political situation. The political and economic situation in Afghanistan remained in a difficult situation. The process of establishing the Mujahideen state in Afghanistan intensified after M. Najibullah came to the top of the government. After M. Najibullah was appointed as the leader of Afghanistan, in May 1986, American President Ronald Reagan, Gulbiddin Hekmatyar, Burkhaniddin Rabbani and other Mujahideen leaders were invited to America. After the negotiations between them, an agreement was signed between the Mujahideen in the USA. According to him, the United States will provide military and material support to the Mujahideen. They provide material support to Mujahideen and send them back to Afghanistan.

When M. Najibullah came to the government, he created opportunities for political parties. According to the constitution adopted in 1987, political freedom was granted to all parties.[1] Now they have the right to participate in government management. Five months later, elections were held. A quarter of the seats in the country were allocated to the Mujahideen, and 22% of the seats were given to the AXDP.[2] M. Najibullah allowed the Mujahideen to participate in the administration of the government, but they responded by launching a rocket attack on Kabul.[3] In January 1987, M. Najibullah put forward the National Reconciliation Program, which envisages stopping the missile attacks, calling the opposition to negotiations and forming a coalition government. The leadership of Kabul unilaterally announced the cessation of hostilities for half a year. But it was not possible to do this. Kabul could not develop its effective mechanism.

In 1988, a large field commander of B. Rabbani's "Afghanistan Islamic Society" group, under Tajik Ahmad Shah Masud, with a detachment of 5-8 thousand fighters, went to G. Hikmatyar in the north of the country took militant actions against it.[4] In March of this year, M. Najibullah established a new "coalition" government. However, the ADP retained important positions in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as two of the four vice-presidential positions. The position of the Minister of Defense was declared vacant. According to rumors, he was invited to A.Sh.Mas'ud by the representatives of the opposition. But A. Mas'ud denied it. Two months later Shah Nawaz Tanay took this position.[5]

Despite the failure of the policy of national reconciliation, the leadership of Kabul did not stop the idea of negotiating with the opposition forces. The company of establishing contacts with reputable field commanders, who are independent from the control of Islamic opposition parties, has spread widely. A number of them signed a document to join the regime or stop fighting. The same was done with the khans of the Pashtun tribes in the southern and southeastern regions of Afghanistan. Even so, it had little effect on changing the situation in M. Najibullah's favor. Most of the signatories used it to



consolidate their power locally or defected to the opposition camps. A number of them worked on both sides. They received weapons and material support from Kabul.[6]

The process of amicable settlement of the Afghan problem has gained momentum. The long-term efforts of the USSR, the United States and General Secretary D. Cordovesa in this direction have finally succeeded. On April 14, 1988, the Geneva Agreement was signed between Kabul and Pakistan. The USSR and the USA became the guarantors of its implementation. The agreement stipulated the obligation of both sides to "respect each other's sovereignty and not interfere in their internal affairs." The guarantors said, "Any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan they took the obligation to refrain from the form. According to the Geneva agreements, on May 15, 1988, the USSR began to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, and this process was completed on February 15, 1989.

The Islamic opposition of Afghanistan, in turn, considered the Kabul regime illegal and did not have the right to represent the country's interests, and accused the signed Geneva agreement. Its leaders announced that the struggle against M. Najibullah's government will continue until victory. In May 1989, they organized a massive attack on the city of Jalalabad, located east of Kabul. But thanks to the bravery of the defenders, the city withstood these attacks. The Mujahideen suffered heavy losses and retreated to the territory of Pakistan. On February 10, 1989, under the strong pressure of the United States and Pakistan, the Mujahideen established the Transitional Government of Afghanistan under the leadership of President S. Mujadadi and Prime Minister A.R. Sayaf in Rawalpindi. Both were part of the seven-party alliance leaders. Leaders and field commanders of other opposition groups did not participate in the elections to the so-called "Government" council, announcing a boycott.

The formation of the government was carried out under the direct influence of the head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), General Hamid Gul, and Saudi funding, mainly on the issue of the appointment of Prime Minister A.R. Sayyaf. The "Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan" group was established on the basis of funds and direct participation of Saudi Arabia.[7] The Saudis have tried hard to keep their guardian Iranian Shia leaders out of Council meetings and have promised to finance the creation of Mujahideen "armies of Islam" if the Wahhabis are serious about the "transitional government". Riyadh's special services spent a total of 26 million dollars to hold the Council. The establishment of the "Transitional Government" made the situation in the camp of the enemies of Najibullah's regime even more complicated. G. Hikmatyar, the most respected of the ministers, told the Pashtuns about the tribal unity of the Ghilzois. They belong to Durranis, who were at the top of the government until 1978 were against Pashtun unification. His family is Pashtun

Although close to the Arabs, S. Mujadiddi, the president of the Transitional Government of Afghanistan, and his Minister of Justice, S. A. Gilani, expressed the interests of the Pashtuns. They were in favor of the return of the king to Afghanistan and the establishment of a new government under his auspices. G. Hikmatyar called Zahir Shah a tyrant and autocratic ruler who opened the country to communist propaganda and strongly opposed it. Conflict among opposition leaders has often led to armed clashes between their factions. Jamil ur-Rahman, a former field commander from the Islamic Party of Afghanistan in Kunar province, created a Wahhabi organization independent of the Peshawar government. It was financially supported by Saudi Arabia, and hundreds of mercenary and volunteer Arab soldiers fought against the Kabul regime together with its fighters. After the surrender of Asmar, the capital of Kunar province, he established the Provincial Council on a par with the same government organizations. B. Rabbani, the leader of a major party, who received the fewest votes and held an insignificant position in the government, felt humiliated. The disdain for former king Zaheer Shah and his supporters caused resentment among the tribes. On February 8, on the eve of the Council meeting, a group of influential khans and elders organized a demonstration in support of him in Peshawar. It was dispersed by the fighters of G. Hikmatyar from the Islamic Party. The Peshawar "government" failed to establish itself on the territory of Afghanistan or to hold the promised general elections. Even so, him Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Malaysia and Sudan have recognized it.[8]

Meanwhile, it became clear that the "transitional government" in Peshawar is not strong. The conflict between the leaders of the Islamic groups became evident immediately after its establishment. Protest movements of Pakistanis, competition between parties and unexpected brutal resistance by the Kabul



regime left no chance for the "Peshowar government". A few months after the failure of the Jalalabad operation, Ahmad Shah Masood and his The Oversight Board decided to propose their action plan as an alternative strategy to Pakistan's interagency intelligence. However, on July 9, 1989, Ahmad Shah Mas'ud had to postpone the important strategic relations of the city of Kunduz when he learned that on July 9, 1989, one of the field commanders, G. Hikmatyar, had captured and killed 10 of his commanders and about 20 ordinary fighters. Mas'ud captured 4 culprits and hanged them according to the decision of the ulema court. S. Mujadaddy called G. Hikmatyar a criminal and a terrorist. The lack of unity and military failures led to a split in the "transitional government". At the same time, the impasse in the country forced several opposition leaders to compromise with Kabul. At the end of 1989, the leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan S.A. Gilani held a number of secret meetings with people around President Najibullah, including N.H. Alumi.

On March 6, 1990, General Tanay launched an armed uprising against the president. The presidential palace was captured. The fighting that escalated in the city caused a large number of casualties among civilians. But the uprising was suppressed that day. General Tanay and his close comrades N.M.Moamand and M.S.Karwal, a member of the Central Council of the People's Democratic Party, N.Muhammad, a candidate for a member of the Political Bureau, former Minister of Defense, and General A.Qadir Agha fled to Pakistan and joined Hekmatyar.[9] Mass arrests of supporters of General Tanai took place in other cities as well. The position of Minister of Defense was taken by A. Vatanjar, who changed many positions in the governments of Taraki, Amin and Karmal. Among the rebels was A. Sarvari. Government authorities reported that A. Sarwari left the embassy in Aden and arrived in India and established contact with Pakistani intelligence through G. Hikmatyar and P. G. Vafodor. Tanai himself soon appeared in Afghanistan as the front commander of the Hekmatyar party in Logar province.

In the spring of 1992, the overthrow of the military-state and party regime in Kabul became unrepeatable. It turned out that the army was divided between the populists and the Parchamists. All new districts came under the control of the opposition. In March 1992, the commander of the 53rd division, Uzbek General A.R. Dostum, announced that he had severed ties with Kabul and joined the Mujahideen.

In April, A.R. Dostum established his political institution - the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan in Mazar-e-Sharif. It included many representatives of the "Vatan" party and mujahideen of various sects. They expanded their control over a number of northern provinces. S.M. Nodiri, the head of police organizations of Boglan region, also cut ties with Najibullah's regime. Popularists from radical religious sects - Minister of Defense A. Vatanjar, General Fattah, Parchamist A. Rafi and others established open communication with G. Hikmatyar. A.Sh. Mas'ud, who took two influential allies of M. Najibullah, members of the political bureau, Tajik Farid Mazdak and Doud Kavyan, also separated from M. Najibullah's system. At the end of April, close friends and comrades of President M. Najibullah, Parchamists led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdul Wakil betrayed him. They planned to overthrow M. Najibullah and create a new government with the participation of the Islamic opposition. On April 15, M. Najibullo submitted his resignation to the UN office in Kabul.

During the crisis of M. Najibullah's government, the political organization known as "Islamic Union of Afghan Mujahideen", belonging to the Sunni sect of Mujahideen, was the main contender for power.

The Mujahideen Transitional Government formed in Peshawar took over the government in Afghanistan in April 1992. But the political situation in Afghanistan has not stabilized. The country's parliament was dissolved, and all laws inconsistent with Sharia were abolished. Although the country was officially called the Islamic State of Afghanistan based on Islamic laws and regulations, in practice the country was divided between the political and military groups (tanzim) of the Mujahideen. According to the mutual agreement of the Mujahideen, it was agreed to take turns to lead the transitional government in Kabul, and S. Mujadadi, the leader of the "National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan", took the position of the head of state for a period of two months. After that, the power passed to the leader of the "Islamic Society of Afghanistan" B. Rabbani, and he will be in power for a period of four months, after which the Mujahideen's council of authorized persons will elect the state



president for a period of two years.[10] it was necessary. The leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan G. Hekmatyar, the leading political organization in the Islamic Union of Mujahideen of Afghanistan, formed his own government, noting that the transitional government was formed in his absence and that the representatives of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan were not included in the transitional government. He launched an attack to capture Kabul. Against this, the commander of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Masud, and the military forces belonging to General Abdul Rashid Dostum, who served the former pro-Soviet government and began to cooperate with the Mujahideen after its crisis, began to march to Kabul, and Ahmad Shah Masud's troops began to attack the city. the north-western and central parts, Abdul Rashid Dostum's military units took control of the areas around the capital's airport, and G. Hikmatyar's troops took control of the south-eastern part of the city.

By this time, the "Afghanistan Islamic Unity Party" (Hezb-e Wahdat-e Eslami-ye Afghanistan) was led by Abdulla Ali Mazari, which united citizens of Hazari nationality belonging to the Shiite sect and became active during the crisis of the pro-Soviet government. He occupied the southwestern part of Kabul.

The above-mentioned military leaders divided not only the capital Kabul, but also the entire country, and took certain areas under their control. For example, A. Masud controlled the north-eastern region of the country, A. Dostum controlled several northern regions with Mazori Sharif as its center, Ismail Khan Herat and its surrounding areas, G. Hikmatyar controlled the south-eastern region of the country, and the Hazaris controlled the central part of Bamiyan.

Differences in views and positions between Mujahideen parties, their desire to take a greater share in the state administration, caused the dissatisfaction of others and made the situation even more complicated. For example, during the time of S. Mujaddadi and during the time of B. Rabbani, the leader of AIP G. Hikmatyar was offered the post of prime minister, but G. Hikmatyar does not want to work under the leadership of a single person and strives to occupy the highest position in the state by himself. Such protest of G. Hikmatyar became an excuse for him to constantly bombard the city of Kabul with artillery and to close the Parvan-Kabul road, which supplies the capital with daily necessities. Also, in order to reduce the influence of Tajik national A. Masud, who held the position of defense minister in the transitional government during the short-term leadership of S. Mujaddadi, he supported Uzbek A. Dostum and made him an army general. gave the title and was approved by the "Afghanistan Islamic Unity Party" of Hazaris. S. Mujaddadi in his speech at the time of handing over power to B. Rabbani emphasized that "he has a great role in taking power from the communists and establishing an Islamic state", and accused other leaders of Mujahideen of threatening the transitional government. He also expressed great gratitude to the "Afghanistan National Islamic Movement" and "Afghanistan Islamic Unity Party" founded in June 1992 under the leadership of A. Dostum for their contribution to maintaining the unity of the country and protecting its security.

However, S. Mujaddadi's actions like the above led to the emergence of big problems in the future in the way of establishing a single state in Afghanistan and made it impossible to create a stable alliance between Mujahideen and non-Pashtun ethnic groups.[11]

During the four-month period when B. Rabbani was the head of the state, the disagreements between the Mujahideen became more acute. At the end of this four-month period, in December 1992, the Mujahideen council of authorized persons held its meeting to elect the state president for a two-year term. However, even in this Council, due to differences of views and disagreements, a single opinion could not be reached. Despite this, B. Rabbani took the position of the President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan for a period of two years with the majority of the authorized persons participating in the work of the Council. Although the presidential elections were over, the legitimacy of B. Rabbani's authority was under doubt. G. Hekmatyar continued to bombard Kabul without recognizing the election results. Despite the fact that B. Rabbani's government was formed with representatives of more than twenty different political forces, taking into account the interests of them, soon there was a serious division between them. A. Masud, who held the post of defense minister in the government of B. Rabbani, sought to unite all military and political groups under his control, strained his relations



with A. Dostum, and later with the Hazaris. During 1993 and at the beginning of 1994, the socio-political and military situation in Afghanistan became extremely complicated. At the beginning of 1993, it caused various events in Afghanistan. At the beginning of 1993, new disagreements arose in Afghanistan on the pretext of power struggle by various political and military groups. In order to put an end to such disagreements, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia issued a call for peace in January 1993. As a result, in February 1993, various political and military groups fighting for power in Afghanistan signed the Islamabad Agreement aimed at ending the conflict under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran. After signing this agreement, all participants organized a trip to the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, circumambulated the Holy Kaaba and swore to strictly adhere to the Islamabad agreement.[12]

According to the Islamabad agreement, B.Rabbani should act as the president of the country, and G.Hikmatyar should take the position of the prime minister, but G.Hikmatyar was completely opposed to Ahmadshah Masud acting as the defense minister in the government, and military conflicts continued in the country. and the internal political situation became tense. Because of this, in 1993, the forces consisting of G. Hikmatyar, A. Dostum, S. Mujaddadi and a branch of the "Afghanistan Islamic Unity Party" led by A. A. Mazari formed the "Coordinating Council of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan" and began to act against the government of B. Rabbani.

The above disagreements between the political forces turned into a mutual war on the principle of "all against all" and this war continued until the Taliban movement gained power and the centralized state system in Afghanistan completely collapsed. created the basis for the emergence of state-like political structures located in separate regions. The existence of such a state of political disunity in Afghanistan has led to the emergence of opinions and views in political and scientific circles about the need to change the structure of the Afghan state, that is, to transform Afghanistan from a unitary state to a state with a federal structure.

Analyzing the period of Mujahideen rule, it becomes clear that during this period Afghanistan was actually divided into "small estates". The reason why I use the term "small estates" here is that a person with authority holding a certain area under his control, or a field commander, exercises supreme authority in this area and rules it as he sees fit, his hand The term "Dostimistan" [13] applied to the northern regions under the control of A. Dostum in the political circles (Balkh, Juzjan, Foryob, Kunduz, provinces with Mazori Sharif as its center), under the control of A. Masud led to the emergence of the term "Masudistan"[14] applied to the north-eastern regions of the country.

The situation in Afghanistan could not fail to influence the neighboring countries and the political processes in the region to a certain extent. In particular, the political situation in Afghanistan at the beginning of 1993 was not beneficial for Russia and Central Asian countries. However, this complicated situation would satisfy other parties whose interests collide.

First, in the internal political struggle in Afghanistan, Rabbani's fake state structures acted as a buffer protecting the southern borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was formed on the territory of the former Soviet Union, from the war in Afghanistan.[15]

Secondly, after the fall of M. Najibullah's regime, most of the Pashtun mujahideen military field commanders preferred complete independence within their tribe or territory rather than fighting for a single Afghan state.

Thirdly, at the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century, the United States lost interest in the Afghan conflict. This could be explained by the fact that after the victory in the "Cold War" and the disintegration of the Soviet state, the conflict in Afghanistan ceased to have the character of a global political and ideological struggle.



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