

## JALALIDDIN MANGUBERDI'S STRATEGY IN HIS BATTLE ACTIONS: BATTLES IN IRAN AND THE CAUCASUS

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**Annotation:** *In this article, information on the strategy, number and composition of troops, weapons used by Sultan Jalal al-Din Manguberdi in his battles in Iran and the Caucasus is covered by scientific foundations.*

**Keywords:** *the battle, military strategy, weapons, equipment, tactical methods, combat order, detachment of the army.*

After our country gained independence, great attention was paid to studying the history of our people on new conceptual and methodological foundations, and great work was done in this area. During his several visits to the Khorezm region, the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev emphasized the need for a more in-depth study of the activities of Jaloliddin Manguberdi.

Jaloliddin Manguberdi is a defender of his Motherland, a brave commander and statesman, a national hero of our people who left an indelible mark on history, like Spitamen, Mukanna, Najmiddin Kubro, Amir Temur. The image of Sultan Jaloliddin Manguberdi is the pride not only of Khorezm, but also of all of Uzbekistan. He is a bright symbol of opposing and delivering a decisive blow to any evil force that encroaches on our freedom and independence [1].

If we say that great people who are equal to him in love and loyalty to the Motherland, honor and glory are rare in the world, we would be stating the same truth. We support this idea with the words of the wise scholar and just ruler Mirzo Ulugbek: "The people of the world have not seen such a brave warrior before or after Jalaluddin. Even greatness itself bows before his determination and courage." It should be the duty of all of us to deeply study the life and activities of our patriotic and courageous ancestors like the great commander Jalaluddin Manguberdi, and to widely promote it among our people, especially the youth [2].

Therefore, we found it appropriate to conduct a scientific study of the strategy used by Sultan Jalaluddin Manguberdi in his battles in Iran and the Caucasus.

On September 5, 1227, near Isfahan, Sultan Jalaluddin Toynol Noyan entered into battle against the Mongol invaders,

30 thousand strong. In this battle, the cavalry units on the right wing of the Sultan's army showed unprecedented courage, pursuing and crushing the Mongols to the territory of Khorasan.

While information about the number of troops on both sides in this battle is given, no exact number is given about the number of Mongol soldiers. Only analysis shows that we know that Genghis Khan, when Jalaluddin was not yet fully armed (in the Battle of Parvan), fielded an army of 35 thousand strong against him.



Now, taking into account the experience gained in battles and the fact that Sultan Jalaluddin was full of strength, at least 30-35 thousand strong troops were fielded to achieve sufficient results. However, the sources exaggerate the number of Jalaluddin's army before this battle, stating that it was 100,000. This is far from the truth.

Because, considering that the sultan had 4,000-5,000 soldiers in his service, who were constantly ready for battle, and that until 1227 the sultan had fought a series of heavy battles, and that the number of his army had decreased, and that Ghiyoseddin Pirshah, who was leading the left wing, had fled the battlefield with his soldiers as soon as the battle began [3, P. 392], it is somewhat closer to the truth that he entered this battle with about 40,000 soldiers due to the soldiers he had gathered from the provinces.

True, there is no doubt about Jalaluddin's leadership skills. However, some shortcomings are evident in the actions of the sultan in this battle. For example, when deploying the wings of the army, the distance between them is quite large, and they are unaware of each other's movements.

This will cost the left wing after Ghiyasiddin leaves the battlefield. That is, the soldiers of the right wing will continue the pursuit until the end, thinking that the left wing is moving forward just like them, and the soldiers of the right wing will not be able to provide support to the left wing and center at the right time.

Another disadvantage was that Jalaluddin, instead of observing the progress of the battle from above and taking control of the situation, gave free rein to his courage and, as always, rushed into the battlefield in the front ranks. This creates chaos in the movement of units.

In this battle, the Sultan, seeing the successful movement of the right wing of his army, led the center and attacked the center of the Mongol army and managed to dislodge them.

However, this retreat of the Mongols was a deception, leading the Sultan's army to an ambush and trapping them. The Mongol army, which was in ambush, knocked the Sultan's left wing off its feet with one blow, forcing them to join the center. After that, the Mongol unit in the ambush and the retreating center turned back and surrounded the army of Sultan Jalaluddin.

Jalaluddin, who remained surrounded, managed to break through the siege and later, by striking the Mongols who were preparing to besiege Isfahan from the other side, forced them to retreat [3, P. 200-201].

In 1228, Jalaluddin's third campaign against Georgia began. The reasons for this campaign are given differently in different sources. However, as we noted above, the full details of Jalaluddin's military campaigns are not part of the subject of the study.

Therefore, it is necessary to reveal the essence of the military strategy and tactics used by Jalaluddin Manguberdi during this campaign.

In general, the main reason for this campaign was an attempt to avenge Georgia's previous defeat, and it is true that Jalaluddin organized a campaign in response to them.

Because the Georgians started the war, they first gathered a large army in a place called Nacharmagevi, and then began to march against Jalaluddin. Jalaluddin had set up camp in Bolnisi at that time. As a result, the two armies clashed in this place and the battle began [4, P. 344].

According to Nasavi, the number of Georgian troops in this battle was more than 40,000 [3, P. 212]. Jalaluddin's army was relatively small. The reason is that according to Juvaini, when Jalaluddin held a council before the battle, his astrologer advised him to defeat the Georgian troops by blocking their water, since they were ten times larger than the Khorezm army [5, P. 394].

Secondly, according to Juvaini, Jalaluddin proposed a single combat before the battle. This information also shows that Jalaluddin's army was small. Because Jalaluddin wanted to decide the fate of the battle through single combat [5, P. 395]. The details of the battle near Bolnisi are not very clear. However, from the available information, some conclusions can be drawn about how the battle unfolded.



According to Nasavi, at the beginning of the battle, the advanced units of both sides clashed [3, p. 212]. The analysis of the battle shows that both sides lined up in the battle in a traditional manner. That is, the center, right and left wings, advanced and reserve units. However, it is unlikely that Jalaluddin's army had a reserve. The reason is that his army was relatively small.

This also shows that in this battle, the advanced unit actively acted against the numerically superior opponent, scattering their ranks and forcing them to retreat. After that, all units went on the attack after the advanced unit. As a result, the remaining Georgian forces began to retreat en masse across the battlefield.

Thus, in this battle, despite the fact that the army of Jalaluddin Manguberdi was much smaller, he won over his enemies and left his name in history as an experienced commander. Sultan Jalaluddin knew how to influence the morale of his army before the battle in order to increase their fighting ability. That is, by calling the opposing side to a single combat before the battle, or when a council was convened before the battle, he was able to calm the commanders and emirs by initially pretending to ignore them and talking about other topics, even though he knew how dangerous the enemy was.

In particular, according to Juvaini, before the Battle of Bolnisi, which was analyzed above, in 1227, the Sultan asked to organize a separate battle of heroes before the battle with the enemy [5, P. 395]. After that, he defeated the Georgian warrior Mountain and his three sons, and then the warrior with the title Aznavr in turn. This had a great positive effect on the morale of the Sultan's army and increased their confidence in victory.

According to the information provided by An-Nasavi, in 1227, before the clash with the Mongol army near Isfahan, he arranged a meeting with the emirs and khans to consult. During the meeting, the Sultan spoke to the emirs and khans about matters that had nothing to do with the Mongols for a long time.

By this he pretended to be indifferent to the Mongols and tried to calm those gathered before him. He made it clear that the arrival of the Mongols was not serious and frightening news. By this he encouraged and cheered up those gathered [3, P. 196-197].

Another of the methods that Jalaluddin used against his opponents and which always proved effective was the method of striking suddenly, when the enemy did not expect it.

This method was first used by Jalaluddin against Kubacha in India. That is, according to Juvaini, an army of 7 thousand people sent under the leadership of Uzbek Toyi against Kubacha's 20 thousand-strong army located in Ucha made a sudden attack at night and forced the enemy, who had not yet had time to touch his weapon, to retreat. This victory is enough to show how strong the military leadership skills of Jalaliddin Manguberdi were. Because, despite the vastly superior enemy army, he defeated the enemy by using the method of surprise attack when he was not expecting it.

The sultan used the same method against Igan Taisii in Hamadan [3, p. 391]. Having seized power in Iraq, the sultan headed towards Azerbaijan to establish a strong state in this territory belonging to the Khorezmshahs that could resist the Mongols [3, p. 123].

However, there were several obstacles in his way to Azerbaijan. Initially, this action of the sultan was considered by Caliph al-Nasir, who was interested in the collapse of the Khorezmshahs, to strengthen his influence in Iraq and Azerbaijan.

Jalaluddin's return from India, first to Iraq, and then to Azerbaijan, and his growing power and prestige, began to bother the Caliph al-Nasir, who was determined to destroy the Sultan at all costs [5, p. 241].

To carry out this plan, the Caliph persuaded the ruler of Azerbaijan, Pir Shah's uncle, Igan Taisi, to oppose Jalaluddin. Igan Taisi led Jalaluddin, who had set out for Azerbaijan with his 50,000th army, and they clashed in Hamadan.



In this battle, Jalaluddin demonstrated his courage and skillful leadership, and with a small army, he managed to defeat his opponent. Igan Taisiy, however, begged Jalaluddin for mercy and surrendered, and his army was incorporated into Jalaluddin's army [3, P. 385].

In conclusion, we can note the following:

1. Sultan Jalaluddin constantly studied the enemy army thoroughly before the battle. If the enemy army was superior in numbers and position on the battlefield, the sultan, as usual, divided his army into parts and tried to strike first and weaken them. This shows that the part of the sultan's army that delivered the initial blow was strengthened to the point of weakening the enemy army with one blow.

2. The sultan's soldiers were armed with the most modern weapons. According to the sources, when Jalaluddin besieged the city of Ikhlot, he armed himself to such an extent that the opponents became more confident in themselves against him. In particular, they used a flintlock that emitted fire when fired [5, P. 400]. This weapon is a rifle in today's language. Later, the sultan's soldiers may have used the same weapon. The reason is that the sultan wins the battle. Jalaluddin may have captured weapons, including this weapon, as booty after all his victories in battles. From this, it can be concluded that the sultan's soldiers probably used a choriq (rifle). (Author's opinion.) The reason is that in achieving great victories, it was not a secret for a commander like Jalaluddin that it was necessary to use not only perfect battle tactics, but also the most effective use of weapons.

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